Scan time: 2026-05-07 11:55:09
Overall Score
⚠ This website has serious GDPR deficiencies. Immediate action is required.
GDPR Issues Detected (3):
❌ 2 third-party server(s) outside the EU/EEA — data transfers without legal basis may violate Art. 44–49 GDPR.
Affected servers outside the EU:
⚠ No Content Security Policy — increased risk of cross-site scripting (XSS) and data theft.
⚠ Missing or unsafe Referrer-Policy — URLs containing personal data may be leaked to third parties.
Note: This automated analysis does not replace legal advice. For a complete GDPR assessment, consult a data protection officer.
↓ See detailed results for each category below.
The website uses an encrypted connection (HTTPS).
Latest encryption active (TLS 1.3 — TLSv1.3).
The security certificate is valid (expires 2026-11-07).
Strong encryption method (TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, 256 bit).
No HSTS header set. Browsers are not forced to use the encrypted connection.
HSTS (HTTP Strict Transport Security) tells the browser: "Always use HTTPS for this domain — no matter what." This prevents attackers on the same WLAN from intercepting the first, unprotected request. Prerequisite: your site is already stable on HTTPS.
File: .htaccess in the web root
<IfModule mod_headers.c>
Header always set Strict-Transport-Security "max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains"
</IfModule>⚠ max-age=31536000 equals 1 year (in seconds). includeSubDomains also covers blog.your-domain.com, shop.your-domain.com etc. — only enable if ALL subdomains support HTTPS, otherwise they become unreachable.
File: .htaccess in the WordPress root
# BEGIN WebForensik HSTS
<IfModule mod_headers.c>
Header always set Strict-Transport-Security "max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains"
</IfModule>
# END WebForensik HSTS⚠ Insert ABOVE the "# BEGIN WordPress" line. Only enable once HTTPS has been stable for a few days — the header is intentionally hard to roll back (browsers remember the instruction).
File: functions.php of your CHILD theme (Appearance → Theme File Editor → functions.php)
add_action('send_headers', function () {
header('Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains');
});⚠ NEVER edit the parent theme — changes are lost on update. Back up functions.php first!
✓ How to verify it works: DevTools (F12) → Network tab → reload page → click the first request → "Response Headers" — must contain "strict-transport-security: max-age=31536000…".
No Content Security Policy (CSP) found. The website has no protection against injected malicious code.
A Content Security Policy (CSP) is a doorkeeper rule for the browser: "Scripts and styles may only be loaded from these allowed sources." Without CSP, injected malicious code (XSS) can freely fetch anything. Start with a simple, secure baseline.
File: .htaccess in the web root
<IfModule mod_headers.c>
Header always set Content-Security-Policy "default-src 'self'; img-src 'self' data: https:; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; font-src 'self' https: data:; object-src 'none'; frame-ancestors 'self'; base-uri 'self'"
</IfModule>⚠ This policy is intentionally pragmatic (allows inline styles since many themes/plugins rely on them). If something breaks after enabling: F12 → Console shows "Refused to load…" — add the affected domain after script-src / img-src.
File: .htaccess in the WordPress root
# BEGIN WebForensik CSP
<IfModule mod_headers.c>
Header always set Content-Security-Policy "default-src 'self'; img-src 'self' data: https:; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; font-src 'self' https: data:; object-src 'none'; frame-ancestors 'self'; base-uri 'self'"
</IfModule>
# END WebForensik CSP⚠ WordPress often loads external scripts (Google Fonts, jQuery CDN, analytics pixel) — if CSP blocks them: open the console, see which domain is blocked, append that domain to "script-src 'self'" separated by a space.
File: functions.php of your CHILD theme
add_action('send_headers', function () {
header("Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'self'; img-src 'self' data: https:; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; font-src 'self' https: data:; object-src 'none'; frame-ancestors 'self'; base-uri 'self'");
});⚠ If unsure: start with "Content-Security-Policy-Report-Only" (only monitor, don’t block), watch violations in the console, then switch to enforced mode.
✓ How to verify it works: Open page, F12 → Console — no red "Refused to load…" messages. Network tab → first request → Response Header "content-security-policy" visible.
No Referrer-Policy set. When clicking external links, the full page URL is shared with other websites.
Without a Referrer-Policy the browser sends the full URL of your current page (incl. search terms, usernames in URL params) on every click to the destination site. Privacy-relevant per Art. 5 GDPR. Recommended safe setting: strict-origin-when-cross-origin.
File: .htaccess in the web root
<IfModule mod_headers.c>
Header always set Referrer-Policy "strict-origin-when-cross-origin"
</IfModule>⚠ "strict-origin-when-cross-origin" is the modern standard: on cross-domain clicks only your origin (no path/params) is sent — internal clicks include the full URL. Stricter is "no-referrer" (send nothing) but it breaks some analytics tools.
File: .htaccess in the WordPress root
<IfModule mod_headers.c>
Header always set Referrer-Policy "strict-origin-when-cross-origin"
</IfModule>⚠ WordPress 4.9+ already emits a meta-tag with this policy, but the HTTP header above applies to all resources (images, scripts) — not only the HTML document.
File: functions.php of your CHILD theme
add_action('send_headers', function () {
header('Referrer-Policy: strict-origin-when-cross-origin');
});⚠ Always back up functions.php before edits.
✓ How to verify it works: F12 → Network → first request → Response Headers — "referrer-policy: strict-origin-when-cross-origin" must be present.
No MIME type protection (X-Content-Type-Options missing). Browsers may misinterpret files.
Without the "X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff" header the browser guesses file types from content — which attackers can exploit (e.g. a HTML file disguised as .jpg is executed as HTML). The fix is one single line.
File: .htaccess in the web root
<IfModule mod_headers.c>
Header always set X-Content-Type-Options "nosniff"
</IfModule>⚠ No side effects expected — considered a safe standard and best practice for years.
File: .htaccess in the WordPress root
<IfModule mod_headers.c>
Header always set X-Content-Type-Options "nosniff"
</IfModule>⚠ Safe to add alongside other Header set entries.
File: functions.php of your CHILD theme
add_action('send_headers', function () {
header('X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff');
});⚠ Back up functions.php before edits.
✓ How to verify it works: F12 → Network → Response Header: "x-content-type-options: nosniff".
No clickjacking protection. The website could be embedded in other pages to trick users.
Without clickjacking protection your site can be invisibly embedded into a malicious page ("enter your password here" — the click actually lands on your overlayed login form). Fix: set SAMEORIGIN (only your own domain may embed).
File: .htaccess in the web root
<IfModule mod_headers.c>
Header always set X-Frame-Options "SAMEORIGIN"
Header always set Content-Security-Policy "frame-ancestors 'self'"
</IfModule>⚠ Use both headers: X-Frame-Options for older browsers, frame-ancestors for modern ones. If you already have a CSP, add "frame-ancestors 'self'" there — don’t duplicate.
File: .htaccess in the WordPress root
<IfModule mod_headers.c>
Header always set X-Frame-Options "SAMEORIGIN"
</IfModule>⚠ If your site is intentionally embedded elsewhere (e.g. booking widget on partner sites): instead of SAMEORIGIN, list allowed domains via CSP: Header always set Content-Security-Policy "frame-ancestors 'self' https://partner.example.com"
File: functions.php of your CHILD theme
add_action('send_headers', function () {
header('X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN');
});⚠ WordPress already tries to set X-Frame-Options — this hook deliberately overrides it.
✓ How to verify it works: F12 → Network → Response Header: "x-frame-options: SAMEORIGIN".
No Permissions-Policy set. Third-party scripts could access camera, microphone, or location.
Permissions-Policy controls whether scripts (including third-party) may access camera, microphone, location, motion sensors etc. GDPR-relevant because sensitive device APIs can otherwise be reached unnoticed.
File: .htaccess in the web root
<IfModule mod_headers.c>
Header always set Permissions-Policy "camera=(), microphone=(), geolocation=(), payment=(), usb=(), accelerometer=(), gyroscope=(), magnetometer=(), interest-cohort=()"
</IfModule>⚠ "()" at the end means: no caller (not even your own page) may use this API. If you need geolocation (e.g. a map feature): use geolocation=(self) instead of geolocation=(). "interest-cohort=()" disables Google’s FLoC tracking.
File: .htaccess in the WordPress root
<IfModule mod_headers.c>
Header always set Permissions-Policy "camera=(), microphone=(), geolocation=(), payment=(), usb=(), interest-cohort=()"
</IfModule>⚠ Standard WordPress needs none of these APIs. If you use a plugin that needs the camera (QR scanner, video upload), set that API to "(self)".
File: functions.php of your CHILD theme
add_action('send_headers', function () {
header('Permissions-Policy: camera=(), microphone=(), geolocation=(), payment=(), usb=(), interest-cohort=()');
});⚠ Back up functions.php before edits.
✓ How to verify it works: F12 → Network → Response Header: "permissions-policy" visible.
2 first-party and 0 third-party cookie(s).
2 of 2 cookie(s) without Secure flag — sent over unencrypted connections too.
Cookies without the "Secure" flag are also sent over unencrypted HTTP — and can be intercepted by anyone on the same WLAN. There’s no reason to omit Secure on HTTPS-only sites.
File: .htaccess in the web root
<IfModule mod_headers.c>
Header always edit Set-Cookie "^(.*)$" "$1; Secure" "expr=!(resp('Set-Cookie') -strmatch '*Secure*')"
</IfModule>⚠ This header appends "; Secure" to cookies that don’t have it yet. Requires Apache 2.4+. The cleaner fix is to correct the code that sets the cookie (PHP: session.cookie_secure=1 in php.ini, or setcookie() with "secure" => true).
File: functions.php of your CHILD theme
add_filter('secure_logged_in_cookie', '__return_true');
add_action('init', function () {
if (!headers_sent()) {
@ini_set('session.cookie_secure', '1');
@ini_set('session.cookie_httponly', '1');
@ini_set('session.cookie_samesite', 'Lax');
}
});⚠ Sets the Secure flag for WordPress login cookies and PHP session cookies. Plugins that set their own cookies must be configured separately (check plugin settings).
WordPress plugin: Plugins that set cookies (cache, anti-spam, A/B testing) often have toggles like "Secure cookies" or "HTTPS only" in their settings.
✓ How to verify it works: F12 → Application → Cookies → your-domain.com. The "Secure" column should show a checkmark for every cookie.
2 of 2 cookie(s) without HttpOnly flag — could be read by malicious code.
Cookies without the "HttpOnly" flag can be read by JavaScript — an XSS attacker can steal session cookies and impersonate the logged-in user. Set HttpOnly for all cookies JavaScript doesn’t actively need.
File: .htaccess in the web root
<IfModule mod_headers.c>
Header always edit Set-Cookie "^(.*)$" "$1; HttpOnly" "expr=!(resp('Set-Cookie') -strmatch '*HttpOnly*')"
</IfModule>⚠ Cleaner: set cookies with HttpOnly directly (PHP: setcookie(..., [..., 'httponly'=>true])). Exception: cookies that JS actively reads (e.g. some consent cookies).
File: functions.php of your CHILD theme (or better wp-config.php)
@ini_set('session.cookie_httponly', '1');
@ini_set('session.cookie_secure', '1');⚠ WordPress login cookies have been HttpOnly since 2.x. If you use a plugin that sets session cookies (e.g. WooCommerce cart pre-login), check its settings.
✓ How to verify it works: F12 → Application → Cookies → "HttpOnly" column shows checkmarks everywhere (except for deliberately JS-readable cookies like the consent cookie).
1 of 2 cookie(s) without SameSite protection — sent with requests from other websites.
Without "SameSite" cookies are sent on requests from foreign sites — the basis of CSRF attacks (a foreign page silently triggers actions in your name because the login cookie travels along). Set SameSite=Lax as a minimum.
File: .htaccess in the web root
<IfModule mod_headers.c>
Header always edit Set-Cookie "^(.*)$" "$1; SameSite=Lax" "expr=!(resp('Set-Cookie') -strmatch '*SameSite*')"
</IfModule>⚠ SameSite=Lax is a good default. Strict is safer but breaks external links (user clicks from Google to your site — cookies are NOT sent, login is lost). None allows cross-site but requires "; Secure".
File: wp-config.php (above "/* That’s all, stop editing! */")
@ini_set('session.cookie_samesite', 'Lax');
@ini_set('session.cookie_secure', '1');
@ini_set('session.cookie_httponly', '1');⚠ Sets SameSite/Secure/HttpOnly for PHP session cookies. WordPress login cookies have been SameSite=Lax since WP 6.2. Update older versions!
✓ How to verify it works: F12 → Application → Cookies → "SameSite" column should show "Lax" or "Strict" everywhere, not empty.
| Name | Domain | Encrypted | Server only | SameSite |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| ynfinite-session | kd-agrartechnik.de | No | No | Lax |
| ynfinite-bot-protection | kd-agrartechnik.de | No | No | None |
1 localStorage and 1 sessionStorage item(s) found.
| Name | Value |
|---|---|
| ynfinite-bot-protection | 3v4jhl2iypu |
| Name | Value |
|---|---|
| ynfinite-bot-protection | 3v4jhl2iypu |
26 request(s) to 4 different third-party servers.
2 third-party server(s) outside the EU/EEA — potentially problematic for GDPR compliance.
GDPR-relevant: visitor data (at least IP + User-Agent) is transmitted to servers outside the EU/EEA. Since the Schrems-II ruling (2020) this requires Standard Contractual Clauses + supplementary technical measures AND prior consent. Best fix: replace with EU alternatives where possible.
WordPress plugin: Common culprits and EU alternatives: Google Fonts → Bunny Fonts or self-host (plugin "OMGF — Host Google Fonts Locally"). Google Analytics → Matomo (self-hosted) or Plausible (EU servers). Google reCAPTCHA → hCaptcha (EU) or Friendly Captcha. Google Maps → OpenStreetMap. YouTube embeds → plugin "WP YouTube Lyte" loads only after click. CDN: Cloudflare → BunnyCDN (EU) or KeyCDN.
✓ How to verify it works: Load in incognito mode, F12 → Network → list all requests → check "Domain" column for non-EU servers. After migration no unrequested US domains should load.
2 third-party server(s) within the EU/EEA.
Requested URLs:
https://live-files.ynfinite.de/v1/image/68f23875e267446bad02125e/logo_kdagrar_text.png?w=512
https://live-files.ynfinite.de/v1/image/68f11d4557f9ffcded6065b6/teaser_knoche.png
https://live-files.ynfinite.de/v1/image/69048172fddf4fdde2d97039/logo_dutzi_text.png
https://live-files.ynfinite.de/v1/image/68f11d45bc890ca62b3297ab/teaser_dutzi.png
https://live-files.ynfinite.de/v1/file/690481723a15b08c25bc2e47/logo_knoche_text.png.svg
https://live-files.ynfinite.de/v1/image/6900d9bc024fbf6a8fa13033/speedmax.png?w=800&h=500
https://live-files.ynfinite.de/v1/image/69aff01ac55f38d3db8c10ea/dim-e_rp595.001.png?w=800&h=500
https://live-files.ynfinite.de/v1/image/69047d8f46288b8d400802d5/3d-bild_oekogrubber300_01.png?w=800&h=500
https://live-files.ynfinite.de/v1/image/69048e0d3d8f20cbc6b4be4d/knoche_crossmax_2023_12-11.png?w=800&h=500
https://live-files.ynfinite.de/v1/image/690384b18835f9f19692f1e1/speedmax_300-fr3.png?w=800&h=500
https://live-files.ynfinite.de/v1/image/693931b18b3a0a2efd479c20/fav_kdagrar.png?w=32&h=32
Requested URLs:
https://storage.googleapis.com/ynfinite-production/68f0d3e61790c39c52c8e1a7/68f23875e267446bad02125e/resize_w512.webp?GoogleAccessId=upload-api%40poetic-flight-180409.iam.gserviceaccount.com&Expires=1
https://storage.googleapis.com/ynfinite-production/68f0d3e61790c39c52c8e1a7/68f11d4557f9ffcded6065b6/teaser_knoche.png?GoogleAccessId=upload-api%40poetic-flight-180409.iam.gserviceaccount.com&Expires=
https://storage.googleapis.com/ynfinite-production/68f0d3e61790c39c52c8e1a7/69048172fddf4fdde2d97039/logo_dutzi_text.png?GoogleAccessId=upload-api%40poetic-flight-180409.iam.gserviceaccount.com&Expire
https://storage.googleapis.com/ynfinite-production/68f0d3e61790c39c52c8e1a7/68f11d45bc890ca62b3297ab/teaser_dutzi.png?GoogleAccessId=upload-api%40poetic-flight-180409.iam.gserviceaccount.com&Expires=1
https://storage.googleapis.com/ynfinite-production/68f0d3e61790c39c52c8e1a7/6900d9bc024fbf6a8fa13033/resize_w800xh500.webp?GoogleAccessId=upload-api%40poetic-flight-180409.iam.gserviceaccount.com&Expi
https://storage.googleapis.com/ynfinite-production/68f0d3e61790c39c52c8e1a7/690481723a15b08c25bc2e47/update_logo_knoche_text.png?GoogleAccessId=upload-api%40poetic-flight-180409.iam.gserviceaccount.co
https://storage.googleapis.com/ynfinite-production/68f0d3e61790c39c52c8e1a7/69aff01ac55f38d3db8c10ea/resize_w800xh500.webp?GoogleAccessId=upload-api%40poetic-flight-180409.iam.gserviceaccount.com&Expi
https://storage.googleapis.com/ynfinite-production/68f0d3e61790c39c52c8e1a7/69047d8f46288b8d400802d5/resize_w800xh500.webp?GoogleAccessId=upload-api%40poetic-flight-180409.iam.gserviceaccount.com&Expi
https://storage.googleapis.com/ynfinite-production/68f0d3e61790c39c52c8e1a7/690384b18835f9f19692f1e1/resize_w800xh500.webp?GoogleAccessId=upload-api%40poetic-flight-180409.iam.gserviceaccount.com&Expi
https://storage.googleapis.com/ynfinite-production/68f0d3e61790c39c52c8e1a7/69048e0d3d8f20cbc6b4be4d/resize_w800xh500.webp?GoogleAccessId=upload-api%40poetic-flight-180409.iam.gserviceaccount.com&Expi
https://storage.googleapis.com/ynfinite-production/68f0d3e61790c39c52c8e1a7/693931b18b3a0a2efd479c20/resize_w32xh32.webp?GoogleAccessId=upload-api%40poetic-flight-180409.iam.gserviceaccount.com&Expire
Requested URLs:
https://use.typekit.net/dpt7rjz.css
https://use.typekit.net/af/a4ad37/00000000000000007735c481/31/l?subset_id=2&fvd=n7&v=3
https://use.typekit.net/af/0c7681/00000000000000007735c472/31/l?primer=7cdcb44be4a7db8877ffa5c0007b8dd865b3bbc383831fe2ea177f62257a9191&fvd=n4&v=3
Requested URLs:
https://p.typekit.net/p.css?s=1&k=dpt7rjz&ht=tk&f=37144.37150&a=86980890&app=typekit&e=css
No known trackers detected.
0 of 1 external resource(s) use integrity verification (SRI).
Only some of your external resources (0 of 1) are protected by SRI. Add integrity attributes to the remaining ones too.
WordPress plugin: Approach: view page source → all <script src="https://…"> and <link href="https://…"> without integrity attribute → generate hash at https://www.srihash.org/ → add integrity="sha384-…" crossorigin="anonymous". Plugin "WP-SRI" automates many cases.
✓ How to verify it works: F12 → Console on page load: no "Failed to find a valid digest" messages. Source: all external <script>/<link> have an integrity attribute.
No external resources use integrity verification. Tampered files would not be detected.
SRI (Subresource Integrity) is a checksum in HTML that defines what an externally loaded file MUST look like. If someone tampers with the external file (e.g. a CDN gets compromised), the browser refuses to load it. You add the "integrity" attribute on the script/link tag.
WordPress plugin: In WordPress you can rarely add SRI hashes manually (scripts are queued via wp_enqueue_script()). Plugin "WP-SRI" (in the plugin directory) adds integrity hashes automatically for external scripts/styles. For statically embedded resources in your theme: generate the hash at https://www.srihash.org/, add integrity="sha384-…" and crossorigin="anonymous" on the <script>/<link> tag.
✓ How to verify it works: F12 → Network → requests with status 200 from CDN domains (cdn.jsdelivr.net, cdnjs.cloudflare.com etc.) → in HTML source the tag must contain "integrity=\"sha384-…\" crossorigin=\"anonymous\"".
No CAA records. Any certificate authority could issue a certificate for this domain.
CAA records (Certification Authority Authorization) define in DNS which Certificate Authorities are allowed to issue certificates for your domain. Without a CAA record an attacker could request a fraudulent certificate for your domain at any CA. CAA is pure DNS configuration — set in your registrar/DNS-panel, NOT in WordPress.
Find your host in the table, copy the values to your DNS panel. For multi-CA hosts: one separate CAA record per CA (all with tag issue, flag 0, name @). Additionally recommended: an iodef record with a contact email for abuse reports.
| # | Host | CA(s) used | CAA value(s) — tag issue |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Hetzner Webhosting (basic certificate, free in package) | DigiCert (programme „Encryption Everywhere") | digicert.com |
| 1 | Hetzner Webhosting (Let’s Encrypt, free) | Let’s Encrypt (ISRG) | letsencrypt.org |
| 2 | All-Inkl | Let’s Encrypt + Sectigo (Pro) | letsencrypt.orgsectigo.com |
| 3 | IONOS (1&1) | DigiCert (GeoTrust) + Let’s Encrypt | digicert.comletsencrypt.org |
| 4 | STRATO | Sectigo + Let’s Encrypt | sectigo.comletsencrypt.org |
| 5 | Cloudflare (Universal SSL) | Google Trust Services + DigiCert + Let’s Encrypt | pki.googdigicert.comletsencrypt.org |
| 6 | AWS (ACM / CloudFront) | Amazon Trust Services | amazon.comamazontrust.comawstrust.comamazonaws.com |
| 7 | Mittwald | Let’s Encrypt + Sectigo | letsencrypt.orgsectigo.com |
| 8 | Webgo | Let’s Encrypt + Sectigo | letsencrypt.orgsectigo.com |
| 9 | raidboxes (Managed WordPress) | Let’s Encrypt | letsencrypt.org |
| 10 | Host Europe / DomainFactory | Sectigo + Let’s Encrypt | sectigo.comletsencrypt.org |
Name Type Flag Tag Value
@ CAA 0 issue "digicert.com"
@ CAA 0 issue "letsencrypt.org"
@ CAA 0 iodef "mailto:security@your-domain.com"
The iodef line (last line) is optional but recommended: CAs report abuse attempts to that address. For subdomains (e.g. shop.your-domain.com) create separate records with the subdomain name instead of @ — modern CAs check parent CAA automatically though.
If your host is not on the list: open your current certificate in the browser (padlock → certificate → issuer). The CA name is shown there (e.g. "Sectigo RSA Domain Validation Secure Server CA" → value sectigo.com). Add that as a CAA record, done.
WordPress plugin: CAA records are NOT created in WordPress but in your domain registrar / DNS provider panel (e.g. Hetzner-Robot, IONOS Domains, Cloudflare Dashboard, INWX, etc.). Common label: "CAA record" or under "TXT records" with type selector "CAA". One separate record per CA.
✓ How to verify it works: On https://www.ssllabs.com/ssltest/analyze.html?d=your-domain.com → "DNS CAA" section → all your CAs should be listed. Or via dig: dig CAA your-domain.com.
2 nameservers present — good redundancy.
No IPv6 support (no AAAA record).
Your domain has no IPv6 address (AAAA record). Over 40% of users (especially mobile) reach the internet via IPv6 — they must take the slower IPv4 gateway detour.
WordPress plugin: Pure DNS + server matter. Step 1: check if your host has an IPv6 address for you (hosting panel or support ticket). Step 2: in the DNS panel create an AAAA record pointing to that IPv6. Step 3: test.
✓ How to verify it works: dig AAAA your-domain.com — or online https://ipv6-test.com/validate.php?url=your-domain.com.
SPF record present: v=spf1 include:spf.protection.outlook.com -all — protects against email spoofing.
DMARC record present: v=DMARC1; p=none; rua=mailto:rua@dmarc.brevo.com. — email authentication active.
No security.txt file found (RFC 9116). Security researchers don't know how to report vulnerabilities.
A security.txt (RFC 9116) tells security researchers how to responsibly report vulnerabilities to you. Without it, reports may go to spam or never be sent. A plain text file at the correct path is enough.
File: /.well-known/security.txt (create the folder if it doesn’t exist)
Contact: mailto:security@your-domain.com
Expires: 2027-12-31T23:59:59.000Z
Preferred-Languages: en, de
Canonical: https://your-domain.com/.well-known/security.txt⚠ Replace "security@your-domain.com" with your actual security contact (or a generic info@). "Expires" must be a future date and should be renewed regularly. The file is plain .txt, not PHP.
File: security.txt file in /.well-known/ under your WordPress root
Contact: mailto:security@your-domain.com
Expires: 2027-12-31T23:59:59.000Z
Preferred-Languages: en, de
Canonical: https://your-domain.com/.well-known/security.txt⚠ Via FTP/SFTP create a folder ".well-known" in the WordPress root (the leading dot matters — some FTP tools need "show hidden files" enabled), inside save the file security.txt with the content above. If WordPress redirects the URL: add to .htaccess: RewriteRule ^\.well-known/ - [L]
WordPress plugin: Plugin "security.txt" (search the plugin directory) lets you configure this in the WordPress backend without FTP.
✓ How to verify it works: Open https://your-domain.com/.well-known/security.txt in a browser — content must be visible (no 404).
No external reporting endpoints detected.
No consent banner needed — no trackers or third-party cookies detected.
Privacy policy linked: "Datenschutz" (/de/datenschutz).
Legal notice linked: "Impressum" (/de/impressum).
Privacy policy link is broken: HTTP/1.1 500 Internal Server Error.
The privacy policy link returns an error (HTTP HTTP/1.1 500 Internal Server Error). Effectively the same as no privacy policy — same legal status as missing.
WordPress plugin: Step 1: check the footer menu (Appearance → Menus → Footer menu → which URL does the "Privacy" item link to?). Step 2: does the target page still exist? Pages → All Pages. Step 3: if the page was renamed: update the menu link. Step 4: if deleted: create a new one. Step 5: on permalink issues, visit Settings → Permalinks → Save (no changes — rewrites .htaccess).
✓ How to verify it works: Privacy link in footer → opens the page with status 200, content visible.
All missing security headers combined into one block. Append this block to the end of your .htaccess — done. 9 headers will be set.
The Content-Security-Policy above deliberately includes 'unsafe-inline' for both style-src and script-src. This does NOT provide full XSS protection — it's a pragmatic trade-off, not a bug.
Why? A typical WordPress setup (theme + 5-15 plugins) emits 10-50 different inline <script> blocks into the HTML: jQuery init, slider init, cookie banner, tracking, GTM, web vitals, lazy-load, speculation rules and so on. A strict script-src 'self' blocks them all — the site becomes visually and functionally broken (blank slider, broken cookie banner, dead plugins).
Consequence for scoring: Sites running WordPress with plugins can score at most ~75-85 points in the CSP category in this app — the full 100% rating is only achievable when inline code is signed via nonce or hash (technically demanding, breaks on every theme/plugin update).
Paths to full XSS protection (in increasing complexity):
Anyone who doesn't take one of these paths lives with 'unsafe-inline' — like about 95% of all production WordPress sites on the web. The other CSP directives still protect: default-src 'self' blocks external resources, object-src 'none' bans Flash/Java, frame-ancestors 'self' prevents clickjacking, base-uri 'self' prevents base-tag hijacking. Not maximum protection, but realistic protection for WP reality.
On Hetzner-Konsoleh webhosting (and comparable shared hosts like All-Inkl, IONOS, Strato, 1blu, …), Apache throws a 500 Internal Server Error as soon as Header always edit Set-Cookie … expr=… appears in .htaccess. The Apache error log says:
Can't parse envclause/expression: syntax error, unexpected T_OP_STR_EQ, expecting $end
This is not a WebForensik bug and not a typo — the shared host has blocked the mod_headers expr= subset via AllowOverride limits (for security, because Header edit could also manipulate cookies of other tenants).
☛ For Hetzner-Konsoleh users: use the variant below marked with the red "Hetzner / Shared" badge. It consists of two files (.htaccess + wp-config.php) instead of one, but avoids the 500 error reliably. Cookie flags go into wp-config.php instead of .htaccess.
Append this block to the end of your .htaccess in the web root — done.
<IfModule mod_headers.c>
Header always set Strict-Transport-Security "max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains"
Header always set Content-Security-Policy "default-src 'self'; img-src 'self' data: https:; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; font-src 'self' https: data:; object-src 'none'; frame-ancestors 'self'; base-uri 'self'; upgrade-insecure-requests"
Header always set Referrer-Policy "strict-origin-when-cross-origin"
Header always set X-Content-Type-Options "nosniff"
Header always set X-Frame-Options "SAMEORIGIN"
Header always set Permissions-Policy "camera=(), microphone=(), geolocation=(), payment=(), usb=(), accelerometer=(), gyroscope=(), magnetometer=(), interest-cohort=(), browsing-topics=()"
# Fehlende Cookie-Flags konditional ergänzen (nur wenn nicht schon gesetzt)
Header always edit Set-Cookie "^(.*)$" "$1; Secure" "expr=!(resp('Set-Cookie') -strmatch '*Secure*')"
Header always edit Set-Cookie "^(.*)$" "$1; HttpOnly" "expr=!(resp('Set-Cookie') -strmatch '*HttpOnly*')"
Header always edit Set-Cookie "^(.*)$" "$1; SameSite=Lax" "expr=!(resp('Set-Cookie') -strmatch '*SameSite*')"
</IfModule>
This variant avoids the 500 Internal Server Error on Hetzner-Konsoleh and similar shared hosts (All-Inkl, IONOS, Strato, 1blu …): the .htaccess only contains the header directives (no "Header edit"), cookie flags move into wp-config.php. Two files to edit instead of one, but guaranteed to run.
# BEGIN WebForensik Security
<IfModule mod_headers.c>
Header always set Strict-Transport-Security "max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains"
Header always set Content-Security-Policy "default-src 'self'; img-src 'self' data: https:; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; font-src 'self' https: data:; object-src 'none'; frame-ancestors 'self'; base-uri 'self'; upgrade-insecure-requests"
Header always set Referrer-Policy "strict-origin-when-cross-origin"
Header always set X-Content-Type-Options "nosniff"
Header always set X-Frame-Options "SAMEORIGIN"
Header always set Permissions-Policy "camera=(), microphone=(), geolocation=(), payment=(), usb=(), accelerometer=(), gyroscope=(), magnetometer=(), interest-cohort=(), browsing-topics=()"
</IfModule>
# END WebForensik Security
Insert ABOVE the line "/* That's all, stop editing! */". Back up wp-config.php first!
// === WebForensik: Cookie-Hardening (Hetzner-Konsoleh-tauglich) ===
// Bitte OBERHALB der Zeile "/* That's all, stop editing! */" einfügen.
// Wirkt auf PHP-Session- und WordPress-Login-Cookies.
// Plugin-eigene Cookies (z.B. WooCommerce, Cookie-Banner) müssen in den
// Plugin-Einstellungen separat auf "Secure" gestellt werden.
@ini_set('session.cookie_secure', '1');
@ini_set('session.cookie_httponly', '1');
@ini_set('session.cookie_samesite', 'Lax');
if (!defined('FORCE_SSL_ADMIN')) define('FORCE_SSL_ADMIN', true);
Insert this block ABOVE the "# BEGIN WordPress" line, otherwise WP overwrites it on permalink changes.
# BEGIN WebForensik Security
<IfModule mod_headers.c>
Header always set Strict-Transport-Security "max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains"
Header always set Content-Security-Policy "default-src 'self'; img-src 'self' data: https:; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; font-src 'self' https: data:; object-src 'none'; frame-ancestors 'self'; base-uri 'self'; upgrade-insecure-requests"
Header always set Referrer-Policy "strict-origin-when-cross-origin"
Header always set X-Content-Type-Options "nosniff"
Header always set X-Frame-Options "SAMEORIGIN"
Header always set Permissions-Policy "camera=(), microphone=(), geolocation=(), payment=(), usb=(), accelerometer=(), gyroscope=(), magnetometer=(), interest-cohort=(), browsing-topics=()"
# Fehlende Cookie-Flags konditional ergänzen
Header always edit Set-Cookie "^(.*)$" "$1; Secure" "expr=!(resp('Set-Cookie') -strmatch '*Secure*')"
Header always edit Set-Cookie "^(.*)$" "$1; HttpOnly" "expr=!(resp('Set-Cookie') -strmatch '*HttpOnly*')"
Header always edit Set-Cookie "^(.*)$" "$1; SameSite=Lax" "expr=!(resp('Set-Cookie') -strmatch '*SameSite*')"
</IfModule>
# END WebForensik Security
If your host disallows .htaccess changes: append this PHP snippet to the end of your CHILD theme's functions.php. Back up first — NEVER edit the parent theme, it gets overwritten on updates.
add_action('send_headers', function () {
header("Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains");
header("Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'self'; img-src 'self' data: https:; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; font-src 'self' https: data:; object-src 'none'; frame-ancestors 'self'; base-uri 'self'; upgrade-insecure-requests");
header("Referrer-Policy: strict-origin-when-cross-origin");
header("X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff");
header("X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN");
header("Permissions-Policy: camera=(), microphone=(), geolocation=(), payment=(), usb=(), accelerometer=(), gyroscope=(), magnetometer=(), interest-cohort=(), browsing-topics=()");
});
// Cookie-Flags für PHP-Session-Cookies — wirkt nur auf $_SESSION,
// NICHT auf von Plugins/Themes per setcookie() gesetzte Cookies.
// Für umfassende Cookie-Absicherung die .htaccess-Variante oben verwenden.
add_action('init', function () {
if (headers_sent()) return;
@ini_set('session.cookie_secure', '1');
@ini_set('session.cookie_httponly', '1');
@ini_set('session.cookie_samesite', 'Lax');
}, 1);
| Header | Value |
|---|---|
| content-encoding | gzip |
| content-length | 10333 |
| content-type | text/html; charset=utf-8 |
| date | Thu, 07 May 2026 09:54:38 GMT |
| server | Apache |
| set-cookie | ynfinite-session=7bb49cf32974c4555a462cc1fa16fbe2; expires=Thu, 07 May 2026 10:54:38 GMT; Max-Age=3600; path=/; SameSite=Lax |
| vary | Accept-Encoding |