Scan time: 2026-05-06 18:44:55
Overall Score
⚠ This website needs improvement regarding data protection.
GDPR Issues Detected (1):
⚠ Missing or unsafe Referrer-Policy — URLs containing personal data may be leaked to third parties.
Note: This automated analysis does not replace legal advice. For a complete GDPR assessment, consult a data protection officer.
↓ See detailed results for each category below.
The website uses an encrypted connection (HTTPS).
Latest encryption active (TLS 1.3 — TLSv1.3).
The security certificate is valid (expires 2026-06-27).
Strong encryption method (TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, 256 bit).
HSTS is enabled — the browser is instructed to always use the encrypted connection.
HSTS duration: 63072000 seconds (at least 1 year) — very good.
HSTS also applies to all subdomains (includeSubDomains).
HSTS preload is enabled — browsers know about the encryption before the first visit.
Content Security Policy present (via HTTP-Header).
No restriction for scripts defined (script-src/default-src missing).
Your CSP exists but has no script-src — meaning scripts are unrestricted. Scripts are the most common XSS vector. Add script-src together with the other essential directives.
File: .htaccess in the web root
<IfModule mod_headers.c>
Header always set Content-Security-Policy "default-src 'self'; img-src 'self' data: https:; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; font-src 'self' https: data:; object-src 'none'; frame-ancestors 'self'; base-uri 'self'"
</IfModule>⚠ Replace the existing CSP line (do not add a second one). This policy is deliberately pragmatic — it allows inline styles and data: URIs for images because almost all themes (especially WordPress!) need this. If you use external scripts (CDN), append the domain to script-src: script-src 'self' https://cdn.example.com. For maximum security later, gradually tighten style-src to 'self' and verify in the browser (F12 → Console) that no inline-style violations appear.
File: .htaccess in the WordPress root
<IfModule mod_headers.c>
Header always set Content-Security-Policy "default-src 'self'; img-src 'self' data: https:; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; font-src 'self' https: data:; object-src 'none'; frame-ancestors 'self'; base-uri 'self'"
</IfModule>⚠ Replace the existing CSP. IMPORTANT for WordPress: img-src with data: enables emoji + admin-bar SVGs, style-src 'unsafe-inline' allows the many inline styles from themes and plugins — without both, the site will break visually. Common WP script sources to add to script-src: 'self' (own), https://www.googletagmanager.com (GTM), https://www.google-analytics.com (GA) — append after 'self' with a space.
File: functions.php of your CHILD theme
add_action('send_headers', function () {
header("Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'self'; img-src 'self' data: https:; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; font-src 'self' https: data:; object-src 'none'; frame-ancestors 'self'; base-uri 'self'");
});⚠ Watch out for existing send_headers hooks — keep only one active. Back up functions.php before editing!
✓ How to verify it works: F12 → Network → Response Header content-security-policy contains "script-src 'self'". Console: no script blocks, no "Refused to load…" messages.
Referrer-Policy: strict-origin-when-cross-origin strict-origin-when-cross-origin (via HTTP-Header).
The setting "strict-origin-when-cross-origin strict-origin-when-cross-origin" shares too much URL information with other websites.
Your current Referrer-Policy reveals too much (e.g. "unsafe-url" or "no-referrer-when-downgrade"). Switch to a more privacy-friendly setting.
File: .htaccess in the web root
<IfModule mod_headers.c>
Header always set Referrer-Policy "strict-origin-when-cross-origin"
</IfModule>⚠ Replace the existing Referrer-Policy line.
File: .htaccess in the WordPress root
<IfModule mod_headers.c>
Header always set Referrer-Policy "strict-origin-when-cross-origin"
</IfModule>⚠ Replace the existing Referrer-Policy entry.
✓ How to verify it works: F12 → Network → Response Header — new value visible.
No MIME type protection (X-Content-Type-Options missing). Browsers may misinterpret files.
Without the "X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff" header the browser guesses file types from content — which attackers can exploit (e.g. a HTML file disguised as .jpg is executed as HTML). The fix is one single line.
File: .htaccess in the web root
<IfModule mod_headers.c>
Header always set X-Content-Type-Options "nosniff"
</IfModule>⚠ No side effects expected — considered a safe standard and best practice for years.
File: .htaccess in the WordPress root
<IfModule mod_headers.c>
Header always set X-Content-Type-Options "nosniff"
</IfModule>⚠ Safe to add alongside other Header set entries.
File: functions.php of your CHILD theme
add_action('send_headers', function () {
header('X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff');
});⚠ Back up functions.php before edits.
✓ How to verify it works: F12 → Network → Response Header: "x-content-type-options: nosniff".
Invalid X-Frame-Options value: SAMEORIGIN SAMEORIGIN.
Your X-Frame-Options header has an invalid value. Only "DENY" (no embedding at all) or "SAMEORIGIN" (only your domain) are allowed.
File: .htaccess in the web root
<IfModule mod_headers.c>
Header always set X-Frame-Options "SAMEORIGIN"
</IfModule>⚠ Replace the malformed value. If you want NO embedding at all, use DENY instead of SAMEORIGIN.
File: .htaccess in the WordPress root
<IfModule mod_headers.c>
Header always set X-Frame-Options "SAMEORIGIN"
</IfModule>⚠ Replace the malformed entry.
✓ How to verify it works: F12 → Network → Response Header: value is DENY or SAMEORIGIN.
Permissions-Policy is configured — access to sensitive device APIs is controlled.
4 of 6 sensitive APIs restricted — very good.
2 first-party and 0 third-party cookie(s).
2 of 2 cookie(s) without Secure flag — sent over unencrypted connections too.
Cookies without the "Secure" flag are also sent over unencrypted HTTP — and can be intercepted by anyone on the same WLAN. There’s no reason to omit Secure on HTTPS-only sites.
File: .htaccess in the web root
<IfModule mod_headers.c>
Header always edit Set-Cookie "^(.*)$" "$1; Secure" "expr=!(resp('Set-Cookie') -strmatch '*Secure*')"
</IfModule>⚠ This header appends "; Secure" to cookies that don’t have it yet. Requires Apache 2.4+. The cleaner fix is to correct the code that sets the cookie (PHP: session.cookie_secure=1 in php.ini, or setcookie() with "secure" => true).
File: functions.php of your CHILD theme
add_filter('secure_logged_in_cookie', '__return_true');
add_action('init', function () {
if (!headers_sent()) {
@ini_set('session.cookie_secure', '1');
@ini_set('session.cookie_httponly', '1');
@ini_set('session.cookie_samesite', 'Lax');
}
});⚠ Sets the Secure flag for WordPress login cookies and PHP session cookies. Plugins that set their own cookies must be configured separately (check plugin settings).
WordPress plugin: Plugins that set cookies (cache, anti-spam, A/B testing) often have toggles like "Secure cookies" or "HTTPS only" in their settings.
✓ How to verify it works: F12 → Application → Cookies → your-domain.com. The "Secure" column should show a checkmark for every cookie.
2 of 2 cookie(s) without HttpOnly flag — could be read by malicious code.
Cookies without the "HttpOnly" flag can be read by JavaScript — an XSS attacker can steal session cookies and impersonate the logged-in user. Set HttpOnly for all cookies JavaScript doesn’t actively need.
File: .htaccess in the web root
<IfModule mod_headers.c>
Header always edit Set-Cookie "^(.*)$" "$1; HttpOnly" "expr=!(resp('Set-Cookie') -strmatch '*HttpOnly*')"
</IfModule>⚠ Cleaner: set cookies with HttpOnly directly (PHP: setcookie(..., [..., 'httponly'=>true])). Exception: cookies that JS actively reads (e.g. some consent cookies).
File: functions.php of your CHILD theme (or better wp-config.php)
@ini_set('session.cookie_httponly', '1');
@ini_set('session.cookie_secure', '1');⚠ WordPress login cookies have been HttpOnly since 2.x. If you use a plugin that sets session cookies (e.g. WooCommerce cart pre-login), check its settings.
✓ How to verify it works: F12 → Application → Cookies → "HttpOnly" column shows checkmarks everywhere (except for deliberately JS-readable cookies like the consent cookie).
| Name | Domain | Encrypted | Server only | SameSite |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| _pk_id.1.50af | hi-reg.de | No | No | Lax |
| _pk_ses.1.50af | hi-reg.de | No | No | Lax |
1 localStorage and 0 sessionStorage item(s) found.
| Name | Value |
|---|---|
| readabler | {} |
No third-party requests detected — all content comes from the website's own server.
No known trackers detected.
No external scripts or stylesheets loaded.
No CAA records. Any certificate authority could issue a certificate for this domain.
CAA records (Certification Authority Authorization) define in DNS which Certificate Authorities are allowed to issue certificates for your domain. Without a CAA record an attacker could request a fraudulent certificate for your domain at any CA. CAA is pure DNS configuration — set in your registrar/DNS-panel, NOT in WordPress.
Find your host in the table, copy the values to your DNS panel. For multi-CA hosts: one separate CAA record per CA (all with tag issue, flag 0, name @). Additionally recommended: an iodef record with a contact email for abuse reports.
| # | Host | CA(s) used | CAA value(s) — tag issue |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Hetzner Webhosting (basic certificate, free in package) | DigiCert (programme „Encryption Everywhere") | digicert.com |
| 1 | Hetzner Webhosting (Let’s Encrypt, free) | Let’s Encrypt (ISRG) | letsencrypt.org |
| 2 | All-Inkl | Let’s Encrypt + Sectigo (Pro) | letsencrypt.orgsectigo.com |
| 3 | IONOS (1&1) | DigiCert (GeoTrust) + Let’s Encrypt | digicert.comletsencrypt.org |
| 4 | STRATO | Sectigo + Let’s Encrypt | sectigo.comletsencrypt.org |
| 5 | Cloudflare (Universal SSL) | Google Trust Services + DigiCert + Let’s Encrypt | pki.googdigicert.comletsencrypt.org |
| 6 | AWS (ACM / CloudFront) | Amazon Trust Services | amazon.comamazontrust.comawstrust.comamazonaws.com |
| 7 | Mittwald | Let’s Encrypt + Sectigo | letsencrypt.orgsectigo.com |
| 8 | Webgo | Let’s Encrypt + Sectigo | letsencrypt.orgsectigo.com |
| 9 | raidboxes (Managed WordPress) | Let’s Encrypt | letsencrypt.org |
| 10 | Host Europe / DomainFactory | Sectigo + Let’s Encrypt | sectigo.comletsencrypt.org |
Name Type Flag Tag Value
@ CAA 0 issue "digicert.com"
@ CAA 0 issue "letsencrypt.org"
@ CAA 0 iodef "mailto:security@your-domain.com"
The iodef line (last line) is optional but recommended: CAs report abuse attempts to that address. For subdomains (e.g. shop.your-domain.com) create separate records with the subdomain name instead of @ — modern CAs check parent CAA automatically though.
If your host is not on the list: open your current certificate in the browser (padlock → certificate → issuer). The CA name is shown there (e.g. "Sectigo RSA Domain Validation Secure Server CA" → value sectigo.com). Add that as a CAA record, done.
WordPress plugin: CAA records are NOT created in WordPress but in your domain registrar / DNS provider panel (e.g. Hetzner-Robot, IONOS Domains, Cloudflare Dashboard, INWX, etc.). Common label: "CAA record" or under "TXT records" with type selector "CAA". One separate record per CA.
✓ How to verify it works: On https://www.ssllabs.com/ssltest/analyze.html?d=your-domain.com → "DNS CAA" section → all your CAs should be listed. Or via dig: dig CAA your-domain.com.
3 nameservers present — good redundancy.
No IPv6 support (no AAAA record).
Your domain has no IPv6 address (AAAA record). Over 40% of users (especially mobile) reach the internet via IPv6 — they must take the slower IPv4 gateway detour.
WordPress plugin: Pure DNS + server matter. Step 1: check if your host has an IPv6 address for you (hosting panel or support ticket). Step 2: in the DNS panel create an AAAA record pointing to that IPv6. Step 3: test.
✓ How to verify it works: dig AAAA your-domain.com — or online https://ipv6-test.com/validate.php?url=your-domain.com.
SPF record present: v=spf1 redirect=hi-reg.de.spf.hornetdmarc.com — protects against email spoofing.
DMARC record present: v=DMARC1; p=quarantine; pct=100; fo=0:s:d:1; rua=mailto:a.qwm448aq@reports.hornetdmarc.com — email authentication active.
No security.txt file found (RFC 9116). Security researchers don't know how to report vulnerabilities.
A security.txt (RFC 9116) tells security researchers how to responsibly report vulnerabilities to you. Without it, reports may go to spam or never be sent. A plain text file at the correct path is enough.
File: /.well-known/security.txt (create the folder if it doesn’t exist)
Contact: mailto:security@your-domain.com
Expires: 2027-12-31T23:59:59.000Z
Preferred-Languages: en, de
Canonical: https://your-domain.com/.well-known/security.txt⚠ Replace "security@your-domain.com" with your actual security contact (or a generic info@). "Expires" must be a future date and should be renewed regularly. The file is plain .txt, not PHP.
File: security.txt file in /.well-known/ under your WordPress root
Contact: mailto:security@your-domain.com
Expires: 2027-12-31T23:59:59.000Z
Preferred-Languages: en, de
Canonical: https://your-domain.com/.well-known/security.txt⚠ Via FTP/SFTP create a folder ".well-known" in the WordPress root (the leading dot matters — some FTP tools need "show hidden files" enabled), inside save the file security.txt with the content above. If WordPress redirects the URL: add to .htaccess: RewriteRule ^\.well-known/ - [L]
WordPress plugin: Plugin "security.txt" (search the plugin directory) lets you configure this in the WordPress backend without FTP.
✓ How to verify it works: Open https://your-domain.com/.well-known/security.txt in a browser — content must be visible (no 404).
No external reporting endpoints detected.
Cookie consent system detected: Borlabs Cookie, borlabs.
Consent system detected, but banner does not appear to be visible.
Your consent system is wired up but the banner doesn’t appear visibly — perhaps hidden by another plugin or custom CSS. Risk: without a visible banner, no consent is given.
WordPress plugin: Approach: 1) clear browser cache + cookies, use incognito. 2) In the consent plugin: check display conditions (e.g. "only EU visitors" — and you’re testing from a non-EU server). 3) F12 → Console for red errors from consent scripts. 4) Inspector → search DOM for "cookie", "consent" — element present but display:none? z-index too low? 5) Uninstall conflicting cookie-notice plugins.
✓ How to verify it works: Incognito tab, load page, wait 5 seconds — banner visible centered/bottom, doesn’t fully block main content, is clickable.
Privacy policy linked: "DATENSCHUTZ" (/datenschutz/).
Legal notice linked: "IMPRESSUM" (/impressum/).
Privacy policy link is broken: HTTP/1.1 301 Moved Permanently.
The privacy policy link returns an error (HTTP HTTP/1.1 301 Moved Permanently). Effectively the same as no privacy policy — same legal status as missing.
WordPress plugin: Step 1: check the footer menu (Appearance → Menus → Footer menu → which URL does the "Privacy" item link to?). Step 2: does the target page still exist? Pages → All Pages. Step 3: if the page was renamed: update the menu link. Step 4: if deleted: create a new one. Step 5: on permalink issues, visit Settings → Permalinks → Save (no changes — rewrites .htaccess).
✓ How to verify it works: Privacy link in footer → opens the page with status 200, content visible.
All missing security headers combined into one block. Append this block to the end of your .htaccess — done. 6 headers will be set.
The Content-Security-Policy above deliberately includes 'unsafe-inline' for both style-src and script-src. This does NOT provide full XSS protection — it's a pragmatic trade-off, not a bug.
Why? A typical WordPress setup (theme + 5-15 plugins) emits 10-50 different inline <script> blocks into the HTML: jQuery init, slider init, cookie banner, tracking, GTM, web vitals, lazy-load, speculation rules and so on. A strict script-src 'self' blocks them all — the site becomes visually and functionally broken (blank slider, broken cookie banner, dead plugins).
Consequence for scoring: Sites running WordPress with plugins can score at most ~75-85 points in the CSP category in this app — the full 100% rating is only achievable when inline code is signed via nonce or hash (technically demanding, breaks on every theme/plugin update).
Paths to full XSS protection (in increasing complexity):
Anyone who doesn't take one of these paths lives with 'unsafe-inline' — like about 95% of all production WordPress sites on the web. The other CSP directives still protect: default-src 'self' blocks external resources, object-src 'none' bans Flash/Java, frame-ancestors 'self' prevents clickjacking, base-uri 'self' prevents base-tag hijacking. Not maximum protection, but realistic protection for WP reality.
On Hetzner-Konsoleh webhosting (and comparable shared hosts like All-Inkl, IONOS, Strato, 1blu, …), Apache throws a 500 Internal Server Error as soon as Header always edit Set-Cookie … expr=… appears in .htaccess. The Apache error log says:
Can't parse envclause/expression: syntax error, unexpected T_OP_STR_EQ, expecting $end
This is not a WebForensik bug and not a typo — the shared host has blocked the mod_headers expr= subset via AllowOverride limits (for security, because Header edit could also manipulate cookies of other tenants).
☛ For Hetzner-Konsoleh users: use the variant below marked with the red "Hetzner / Shared" badge. It consists of two files (.htaccess + wp-config.php) instead of one, but avoids the 500 error reliably. Cookie flags go into wp-config.php instead of .htaccess.
Append this block to the end of your .htaccess in the web root — done.
<IfModule mod_headers.c>
Header always set Content-Security-Policy "default-src 'self'; img-src 'self' data: https:; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; font-src 'self' https: data:; object-src 'none'; frame-ancestors 'self'; base-uri 'self'; upgrade-insecure-requests"
Header always set Referrer-Policy "strict-origin-when-cross-origin"
Header always set X-Content-Type-Options "nosniff"
Header always set X-Frame-Options "SAMEORIGIN"
# Fehlende Cookie-Flags konditional ergänzen (nur wenn nicht schon gesetzt)
Header always edit Set-Cookie "^(.*)$" "$1; Secure" "expr=!(resp('Set-Cookie') -strmatch '*Secure*')"
Header always edit Set-Cookie "^(.*)$" "$1; HttpOnly" "expr=!(resp('Set-Cookie') -strmatch '*HttpOnly*')"
</IfModule>
This variant avoids the 500 Internal Server Error on Hetzner-Konsoleh and similar shared hosts (All-Inkl, IONOS, Strato, 1blu …): the .htaccess only contains the header directives (no "Header edit"), cookie flags move into wp-config.php. Two files to edit instead of one, but guaranteed to run.
# BEGIN WebForensik Security
<IfModule mod_headers.c>
Header always set Content-Security-Policy "default-src 'self'; img-src 'self' data: https:; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; font-src 'self' https: data:; object-src 'none'; frame-ancestors 'self'; base-uri 'self'; upgrade-insecure-requests"
Header always set Referrer-Policy "strict-origin-when-cross-origin"
Header always set X-Content-Type-Options "nosniff"
Header always set X-Frame-Options "SAMEORIGIN"
</IfModule>
# END WebForensik Security
Insert ABOVE the line "/* That's all, stop editing! */". Back up wp-config.php first!
// === WebForensik: Cookie-Hardening (Hetzner-Konsoleh-tauglich) ===
// Bitte OBERHALB der Zeile "/* That's all, stop editing! */" einfügen.
// Wirkt auf PHP-Session- und WordPress-Login-Cookies.
// Plugin-eigene Cookies (z.B. WooCommerce, Cookie-Banner) müssen in den
// Plugin-Einstellungen separat auf "Secure" gestellt werden.
@ini_set('session.cookie_secure', '1');
@ini_set('session.cookie_httponly', '1');
if (!defined('FORCE_SSL_ADMIN')) define('FORCE_SSL_ADMIN', true);
Insert this block ABOVE the "# BEGIN WordPress" line, otherwise WP overwrites it on permalink changes.
# BEGIN WebForensik Security
<IfModule mod_headers.c>
Header always set Content-Security-Policy "default-src 'self'; img-src 'self' data: https:; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; font-src 'self' https: data:; object-src 'none'; frame-ancestors 'self'; base-uri 'self'; upgrade-insecure-requests"
Header always set Referrer-Policy "strict-origin-when-cross-origin"
Header always set X-Content-Type-Options "nosniff"
Header always set X-Frame-Options "SAMEORIGIN"
# Fehlende Cookie-Flags konditional ergänzen
Header always edit Set-Cookie "^(.*)$" "$1; Secure" "expr=!(resp('Set-Cookie') -strmatch '*Secure*')"
Header always edit Set-Cookie "^(.*)$" "$1; HttpOnly" "expr=!(resp('Set-Cookie') -strmatch '*HttpOnly*')"
</IfModule>
# END WebForensik Security
If your host disallows .htaccess changes: append this PHP snippet to the end of your CHILD theme's functions.php. Back up first — NEVER edit the parent theme, it gets overwritten on updates.
add_action('send_headers', function () {
header("Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'self'; img-src 'self' data: https:; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; font-src 'self' https: data:; object-src 'none'; frame-ancestors 'self'; base-uri 'self'; upgrade-insecure-requests");
header("Referrer-Policy: strict-origin-when-cross-origin");
header("X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff");
header("X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN");
});
// Cookie-Flags für PHP-Session-Cookies — wirkt nur auf $_SESSION,
// NICHT auf von Plugins/Themes per setcookie() gesetzte Cookies.
// Für umfassende Cookie-Absicherung die .htaccess-Variante oben verwenden.
add_action('init', function () {
if (headers_sent()) return;
@ini_set('session.cookie_secure', '1');
@ini_set('session.cookie_httponly', '1');
}, 1);
| Header | Value |
|---|---|
| access-control-allow-headers | Content-Type, Authorization Content-Type, Authorization |
| access-control-allow-methods | GET,POST GET,POST |
| content-security-policy | upgrade-insecure-requests; upgrade-insecure-requests; |
| content-type | text/html; charset=UTF-8 |
| cross-origin-embedder-policy | unsafe-none; report-to='default' unsafe-none; report-to='default' |
| cross-origin-embedder-policy-report-only | unsafe-none; report-to='default' unsafe-none; report-to='default' |
| cross-origin-opener-policy | unsafe-none unsafe-none |
| cross-origin-opener-policy-report-only | unsafe-none; report-to='default' unsafe-none; report-to='default' |
| cross-origin-resource-policy | cross-origin cross-origin |
| date | Wed, 06 May 2026 16:44:22 GMT |
| link | <https://hi-reg.de/wp-json/>; rel="https://api.w.org/", <https://hi-reg.de/wp-json/wp/v2/pages/14>; rel="alternate"; title="JSON"; type="application/json", <https://hi-reg.de/>; rel=shortlink |
| permissions-policy | accelerometer=(), autoplay=(), camera=(), cross-origin-isolated=(), display-capture=(self), encrypted-media=(), fullscreen=*, geolocation=(self), gyroscope=(), keyboard-map=(), magnetometer=(), microphone=(), midi=(), payment=*, picture-in-picture=*, publickey-credentials-get=(), screen-wake-lock=() |
| referrer-policy | strict-origin-when-cross-origin strict-origin-when-cross-origin |
| server | Apache |
| strict-transport-security | max-age=63072000; includeSubDomains; preload max-age=63072000; includeSubDomains; preload |
| x-cache | bypass |
| x-content-security-policy | default-src 'self'; img-src *; media-src * data:; default-src 'self'; img-src *; media-src * data:; |
| x-frame-options | SAMEORIGIN SAMEORIGIN |
| x-permitted-cross-domain-policies | none none |
| x-tec-api-origin | https://hi-reg.de |
| x-tec-api-root | https://hi-reg.de/wp-json/tribe/events/v1/ |
| x-tec-api-version | v1 |