Scan time: 2026-11-05 03:53:47
Overall Score
⚠ This website has serious GDPR deficiencies. Immediate action is required.
GDPR Issues Detected (4):
❌ 3 third-party server(s) outside the EU/EEA — data transfers without legal basis may violate Art. 44–49 GDPR.
Affected servers outside the EU:
❌ 1 tracking service(s) detected — without prior consent (opt-in) this violates Art. 6(1) GDPR.
Detected trackers:
⚠ Third-party cookies are being set — without consent this violates the ePrivacy Directive.
⚠ No Content Security Policy — increased risk of cross-site scripting (XSS) and data theft.
Note: This automated analysis does not replace legal advice. For a complete GDPR assessment, consult a data protection officer.
↓ See detailed results for each category below.
The website uses an encrypted connection (HTTPS).
Latest encryption active (TLS 1.3 — TLSv1.3).
The security certificate is valid (expires 2026-12-07).
Strong encryption method (TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, 256 bit).
HSTS is enabled — the browser is instructed to always use the encrypted connection.
HSTS duration: 31536000 seconds (at least 1 year) — very good.
HSTS also applies to all subdomains (includeSubDomains).
No Content Security Policy (CSP) found. The website has no protection against injected malicious code.
A Content Security Policy (CSP) is a doorkeeper rule for the browser: "Scripts and styles may only be loaded from these allowed sources." Without CSP, injected malicious code (XSS) can freely fetch anything. Start with a simple, secure baseline.
File: .htaccess in the web root
<IfModule mod_headers.c>
Header always set Content-Security-Policy "default-src 'self'; img-src 'self' data: https:; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; font-src 'self' https: data:; object-src 'none'; frame-ancestors 'self'; base-uri 'self'"
</IfModule>⚠ This policy is intentionally pragmatic (allows inline styles since many themes/plugins rely on them). If something breaks after enabling: F12 → Console shows "Refused to load…" — add the affected domain after script-src / img-src.
File: .htaccess in the WordPress root
# BEGIN WebForensik CSP
<IfModule mod_headers.c>
Header always set Content-Security-Policy "default-src 'self'; img-src 'self' data: https:; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; font-src 'self' https: data:; object-src 'none'; frame-ancestors 'self'; base-uri 'self'"
</IfModule>
# END WebForensik CSP⚠ WordPress often loads external scripts (Google Fonts, jQuery CDN, analytics pixel) — if CSP blocks them: open the console, see which domain is blocked, append that domain to "script-src 'self'" separated by a space.
File: functions.php of your CHILD theme
add_action('send_headers', function () {
header("Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'self'; img-src 'self' data: https:; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; font-src 'self' https: data:; object-src 'none'; frame-ancestors 'self'; base-uri 'self'");
});⚠ If unsure: start with "Content-Security-Policy-Report-Only" (only monitor, don’t block), watch violations in the console, then switch to enforced mode.
✓ How to verify it works: Open page, F12 → Console — no red "Refused to load…" messages. Network tab → first request → Response Header "content-security-policy" visible.
Referrer-Policy: strict-origin-when-cross-origin (via HTTP-Header).
Strict setting "strict-origin-when-cross-origin" — no path leak, no HTTP downgrade leak. Best practice.
Invalid value: nosniff nosniff. Expected "nosniff".
Your X-Content-Type-Options header has an invalid value (nosniff nosniff) — expected is exactly "nosniff". Correct it.
File: .htaccess in the web root
<IfModule mod_headers.c>
Header always set X-Content-Type-Options "nosniff"
</IfModule>⚠ Replace the existing malformed line.
File: .htaccess in the WordPress root
<IfModule mod_headers.c>
Header always set X-Content-Type-Options "nosniff"
</IfModule>⚠ Replace the malformed entry.
✓ How to verify it works: F12 → Network → Response Header: value exactly "nosniff".
Clickjacking protection active: X-Frame-Options = SAMEORIGIN.
No Permissions-Policy set. Third-party scripts could access camera, microphone, or location.
Permissions-Policy controls whether scripts (including third-party) may access camera, microphone, location, motion sensors etc. GDPR-relevant because sensitive device APIs can otherwise be reached unnoticed.
File: .htaccess in the web root
<IfModule mod_headers.c>
Header always set Permissions-Policy "camera=(), microphone=(), geolocation=(), payment=(), usb=(), accelerometer=(), gyroscope=(), magnetometer=(), interest-cohort=()"
</IfModule>⚠ "()" at the end means: no caller (not even your own page) may use this API. If you need geolocation (e.g. a map feature): use geolocation=(self) instead of geolocation=(). "interest-cohort=()" disables Google’s FLoC tracking.
File: .htaccess in the WordPress root
<IfModule mod_headers.c>
Header always set Permissions-Policy "camera=(), microphone=(), geolocation=(), payment=(), usb=(), interest-cohort=()"
</IfModule>⚠ Standard WordPress needs none of these APIs. If you use a plugin that needs the camera (QR scanner, video upload), set that API to "(self)".
File: functions.php of your CHILD theme
add_action('send_headers', function () {
header('Permissions-Policy: camera=(), microphone=(), geolocation=(), payment=(), usb=(), interest-cohort=()');
});⚠ Back up functions.php before edits.
✓ How to verify it works: F12 → Network → Response Header: "permissions-policy" visible.
3 first-party and 1 third-party cookie(s).
1 third-party cookie(s) detected. These can be used to track you across different websites.
Third-party cookies (e.g. from Google, Facebook) track visitors across websites. Under GDPR Art. 6 and ePrivacy / national implementations, explicit consent is required BEFORE setting them. Three-step fix: (1) identify which external services set the cookies, (2) remove services you don’t strictly need, (3) for essential services, add a consent banner that loads them only after "Accept".
WordPress plugin: Cookie-consent plugins for WordPress: "Complianz" (free, GDPR-focused, thorough wizard), "Real Cookie Banner" (free, knows many services), "Borlabs Cookie" (paid, most feature-complete). Critical configuration: set all tracking services to "do NOT load before consent" — most plugins detect standard services (GA, Maps, YouTube) automatically.
✓ How to verify it works: Open the site in incognito mode → F12 → Application → Cookies → your-domain.com. BEFORE clicking "Accept" there must be NO cookies from google.com, facebook.com etc. AFTER consent, yes.
3 of 4 cookie(s) without HttpOnly flag — could be read by malicious code.
Cookies without the "HttpOnly" flag can be read by JavaScript — an XSS attacker can steal session cookies and impersonate the logged-in user. Set HttpOnly for all cookies JavaScript doesn’t actively need.
File: .htaccess in the web root
<IfModule mod_headers.c>
Header always edit Set-Cookie "^(.*)$" "$1; HttpOnly" "expr=!(resp('Set-Cookie') -strmatch '*HttpOnly*')"
</IfModule>⚠ Cleaner: set cookies with HttpOnly directly (PHP: setcookie(..., [..., 'httponly'=>true])). Exception: cookies that JS actively reads (e.g. some consent cookies).
File: functions.php of your CHILD theme (or better wp-config.php)
@ini_set('session.cookie_httponly', '1');
@ini_set('session.cookie_secure', '1');⚠ WordPress login cookies have been HttpOnly since 2.x. If you use a plugin that sets session cookies (e.g. WooCommerce cart pre-login), check its settings.
✓ How to verify it works: F12 → Application → Cookies → "HttpOnly" column shows checkmarks everywhere (except for deliberately JS-readable cookies like the consent cookie).
1 of 4 cookie(s) without SameSite protection — sent with requests from other websites.
Without "SameSite" cookies are sent on requests from foreign sites — the basis of CSRF attacks (a foreign page silently triggers actions in your name because the login cookie travels along). Set SameSite=Lax as a minimum.
File: .htaccess in the web root
<IfModule mod_headers.c>
Header always edit Set-Cookie "^(.*)$" "$1; SameSite=Lax" "expr=!(resp('Set-Cookie') -strmatch '*SameSite*')"
</IfModule>⚠ SameSite=Lax is a good default. Strict is safer but breaks external links (user clicks from Google to your site — cookies are NOT sent, login is lost). None allows cross-site but requires "; Secure".
File: wp-config.php (above "/* That’s all, stop editing! */")
@ini_set('session.cookie_samesite', 'Lax');
@ini_set('session.cookie_secure', '1');
@ini_set('session.cookie_httponly', '1');⚠ Sets SameSite/Secure/HttpOnly for PHP session cookies. WordPress login cookies have been SameSite=Lax since WP 6.2. Update older versions!
✓ How to verify it works: F12 → Application → Cookies → "SameSite" column should show "Lax" or "Strict" everywhere, not empty.
| Name | Domain | Encrypted | Server only | SameSite |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| uncode_privacy[consent_types] | sterkyachts.com | Yes | No | Strict |
| cookieyes-consent | sterkyachts.com | Yes | No | Strict |
| uncode_gdpr_session_2bd8634f1eb114eb7f50 | sterkyachts.com | Yes | No | Strict |
| Name | Domain | Encrypted | Server only | SameSite |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| _GRECAPTCHA | www.google.com | Yes | Yes | None |
35 localStorage and 1 sessionStorage item(s) found.
Extensive localStorage usage — may indicate tracking or fingerprinting.
Heavy use of localStorage may indicate tracking or fingerprinting (localStorage isn’t covered by cookie consent but can identify visitors). Check whether the data is actually needed — and if yes, mention it in your privacy policy.
WordPress plugin: localStorage usage usually originates from themes or plugins (cookie banner state, cart, A/B testing, slider position). Approach: F12 → Application → Local Storage → your-domain.com — review entries, identify the likely culprit (plugin name in the key), check the plugin settings or remove the plugin if not needed.
✓ How to verify it works: Incognito browser → load page once → F12 → Application → Local Storage — as few entries as possible, none without a clear functional purpose.
| Name | Value |
|---|---|
| bot_detector_webgl_support | {"value":false,"timestamp":1793847220} |
| ct_bot_detector_event_token | {"value":"\"4d5bb89274df63674c6ff56f97d8b54e30afcdbd3713a203377c9d098670b8d8\"", |
| ct_screen_info | {"value":"\"\"","timestamp":1793847220} |
| bot_detector_send_schedule | {"value":{"failures":0,"intervalMs":2000,"nextSendAt":1793847224501},"timestamp" |
| webp_lossy_supported | true |
| webp_lossless_supported | true |
| bot_detector_user_agent | {"value":"Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, l |
| bot_detector_token_ip_version | {"value":[{"event_token":"4d5bb89274df63674c6ff56f97d8b54e30afcdbd3713a203377c9d |
| ct_checkjs | {"value":"472346958","timestamp":1793847220} |
| bot_detector_page_hits | {"value":1,"timestamp":1793847220} |
| ct_timezone | {"value":"1","timestamp":1793847220} |
| bot_detector_browser_supports_cookies | {"value":true,"timestamp":1793847220} |
| _grecaptcha | 09AKhCRwgzmPVNvzmyFwEkLIPEs-j9WI1gCuT-TjvHd6xyeZ-ze3DTzkp4va_uJ18TornxGfYuY1SxVT |
| apbct_visible_fields | {"value":"\"0\"","timestamp":1793847220} |
| ct_ps_timestamp | {"value":"1793847220","timestamp":1793847220} |
| ct_bot_detector_form_exclusion | {"value":"true","timestamp":1793847222} |
| ct_checked_emails_exist | {"value":"\"0\"","timestamp":1793847220} |
| bot_detector_log_transport_enabled | 1 |
| bot_detector_navigator_property_bind | {"value":false,"timestamp":1793847220} |
| bot_detector_pointer_data | {"value":[],"timestamp":1793847220} |
| ct_pointer_data | {"value":"\"0\"","timestamp":1793847220} |
| bot_detector_prev_dto | {"value":{"agent":"bot_detector_2.1.11","typo":[{"fieldName":"apbct__email_id__s |
| bot_detector_referrer | {"value":"https://sterkyachts.com/","timestamp":1793847220} |
| onetap-accessibility-free | {"dynamicFeatureSet":{"visionImpairedMode":false,"seizureSafeProfileMode":false, |
| bot_detector_typo_data | {"value":[{"fieldName":"apbct__email_id__search_form","fieldType":"INPUT","isAut |
| apbct_existing_visitor | {"value":"1","timestamp":1793847220} |
| bot_detector_outer_vs_inner | {"value":1,"timestamp":1793847220} |
| ct_bot_detector_frontend_data_log | [["success","timestamp_on_send","timestamp_on_received","event_token","js_event" |
| apbct_headless | {"value":"true","timestamp":1793847220} |
| ct_fkp_timestamp | {"value":"\"0\"","timestamp":1793847220} |
| bot_detector_referrer_previous | {"value":"","timestamp":1793847220} |
| bot_detector_event_token | {"value":"4d5bb89274df63674c6ff56f97d8b54e30afcdbd3713a203377c9d098670b8d8","tim |
| bot_detector_headless | {"value":true,"timestamp":1793847220} |
| bot_detector_screen_info | {"value":{"fullWidth":1920,"fullHeight":12511,"visibleWidth":1920,"visibleHeight |
| ct_checked_emails | {"value":"\"0\"","timestamp":1793847220} |
| Name | Value |
|---|---|
| wpEmojiSettingsSupports | {"supportTests":{"flag":false,"emoji":true},"timestamp":1793847220606} |
32 request(s) to 9 different third-party servers.
3 third-party server(s) outside the EU/EEA — potentially problematic for GDPR compliance.
GDPR-relevant: visitor data (at least IP + User-Agent) is transmitted to servers outside the EU/EEA. Since the Schrems-II ruling (2020) this requires Standard Contractual Clauses + supplementary technical measures AND prior consent. Best fix: replace with EU alternatives where possible.
WordPress plugin: Common culprits and EU alternatives: Google Fonts → Bunny Fonts or self-host (plugin "OMGF — Host Google Fonts Locally"). Google Analytics → Matomo (self-hosted) or Plausible (EU servers). Google reCAPTCHA → hCaptcha (EU) or Friendly Captcha. Google Maps → OpenStreetMap. YouTube embeds → plugin "WP YouTube Lyte" loads only after click. CDN: Cloudflare → BunnyCDN (EU) or KeyCDN.
✓ How to verify it works: Load in incognito mode, F12 → Network → list all requests → check "Domain" column for non-EU servers. After migration no unrequested US domains should load.
6 third-party server(s) within the EU/EEA.
Requested URLs:
https://cdn-cookieyes.com/client_data/80def7f247de04a03921b7bac35cdc63/script.js
https://cdn-cookieyes.com/client_data/80def7f247de04a03921b7bac35cdc63/banner.js
https://cdn-cookieyes.com/client_data/80def7f247de04a03921b7bac35cdc63/irdhKeJ5.json
https://cdn-cookieyes.com/client_data/80def7f247de04a03921b7bac35cdc63/config/_na2Ses2.json
https://cdn-cookieyes.com/client_data/80def7f247de04a03921b7bac35cdc63/translations/L7QMJWYh.json
https://cdn-cookieyes.com/client_data/80def7f247de04a03921b7bac35cdc63/audit-table/XscTVAPt.json
https://cdn-cookieyes.com/assets/images/close.svg
https://cdn-cookieyes.com/assets/images/revisit.svg
Requested URLs:
https://cdn.aichatbotjs.com/chatbot.js
https://cdn.aichatbotjs.com/boot.d5c0d7a0.js
https://cdn.aichatbotjs.com/chat.eaa60b4e.js
https://cdn.aichatbotjs.com/messages.37e90b5f.js
https://cdn.aichatbotjs.com/lang-en.62524f69.js
https://cdn.aichatbotjs.com/fonts/plus-jakarta-sans-latin.woff2
Requested URLs:
https://www.google.com/recaptcha/api.js?render=6Le_7OUrAAAAALVRpAYisfgyV734KwCOo8a2VZYk&ver=3.0
https://www.google.com/recaptcha/api2/anchor?ar=1&k=6Le_7OUrAAAAALVRpAYisfgyV734KwCOo8a2VZYk&co=aHR0cHM6Ly9zdGVya3lhY2h0cy5jb206NDQz&hl=en&v=bSuJ2xBC8cFy7pM4Z3Hu9boH&size=invisible&anchor-ms=20000&exe
https://www.google.com/recaptcha/api2/webworker.js?hl=en&v=bSuJ2xBC8cFy7pM4Z3Hu9boH
https://www.google.com/recaptcha/api2/reload?k=6Le_7OUrAAAAALVRpAYisfgyV734KwCOo8a2VZYk
https://www.google.com/recaptcha/api2/clr?k=6Le_7OUrAAAAALVRpAYisfgyV734KwCOo8a2VZYk
Requested URLs:
https://www.gstatic.com/recaptcha/releases/bSuJ2xBC8cFy7pM4Z3Hu9boH/recaptcha__en.js
https://www.gstatic.com/recaptcha/releases/bSuJ2xBC8cFy7pM4Z3Hu9boH/styles__ltr.css
https://www.gstatic.com/recaptcha/api2/logo_48.png
... and 2 more request(s)
Requested URLs:
https://fd-api.cleantalk.org/frontend_data/v2
... and 2 more request(s)
Requested URLs:
https://fd.cleantalk.org/ct-bot-detector-wrapper.js?ver=6.91
https://fd.cleantalk.org/2.1.11/ct-bot-detector.min.js
Requested URLs:
https://log.cookieyes.com/api/v1/log
Requested URLs:
https://server.supportfast.ai/api/v1/widgets/chatbots/website?code=bot-9z02nq73qc&domain=sterkyachts.com
Requested URLs:
https://fonts.gstatic.com/s/roboto/v48/KFO7CnqEu92Fr1ME7kSn66aGLdTylUAMa3yUBA.woff2
1 known tracker(s) detected! These track visitors across different websites.
Trackers (Google Analytics, Facebook Pixel, …) capture visitors and follow them across multiple sites. Under GDPR Art. 6 and ePrivacy / national implementations, explicit consent is required BEFORE loading the tracker. "Continued scrolling = consent" is NOT acceptable.
WordPress plugin: Consent plugins that properly block trackers until consent: "Complianz" (free, very good), "Real Cookie Banner", "Borlabs Cookie" (paid, most thorough). Principle after setup: do NOT embed the tracker snippet (e.g. GA script) directly in your theme — register it with the consent plugin, which only releases it after "Accept". Privacy-friendly tracker alternatives: Matomo (cookieless mode → may need no consent), Plausible (EU, anonymous, vendor claims no consent needed — legal advice recommended).
✓ How to verify it works: Incognito, load page — BEFORE "Accept": F12 → Network → no requests to google-analytics.com, facebook.com/tr etc. AFTER "Accept", yes.
Google (Content): www.google.com, www.gstatic.com
1 of 7 external resource(s) use integrity verification (SRI).
Only some of your external resources (1 of 7) are protected by SRI. Add integrity attributes to the remaining ones too.
WordPress plugin: Approach: view page source → all <script src="https://…"> and <link href="https://…"> without integrity attribute → generate hash at https://www.srihash.org/ → add integrity="sha384-…" crossorigin="anonymous". Plugin "WP-SRI" automates many cases.
✓ How to verify it works: F12 → Console on page load: no "Failed to find a valid digest" messages. Source: all external <script>/<link> have an integrity attribute.
No CAA records. Any certificate authority could issue a certificate for this domain.
CAA records (Certification Authority Authorization) define in DNS which Certificate Authorities are allowed to issue certificates for your domain. Without a CAA record an attacker could request a fraudulent certificate for your domain at any CA. CAA is pure DNS configuration — set in your registrar/DNS-panel, NOT in WordPress.
Find your host in the table, copy the values to your DNS panel. For multi-CA hosts: one separate CAA record per CA (all with tag issue, flag 0, name @). Additionally recommended: an iodef record with a contact email for abuse reports.
| # | Host | CA(s) used | CAA value(s) — tag issue |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Hetzner Webhosting (basic certificate, free in package) | DigiCert (programme „Encryption Everywhere") | digicert.com |
| 1 | Hetzner Webhosting (Let’s Encrypt, free) | Let’s Encrypt (ISRG) | letsencrypt.org |
| 2 | All-Inkl | Let’s Encrypt + Sectigo (Pro) | letsencrypt.orgsectigo.com |
| 3 | IONOS (1&1) | DigiCert (GeoTrust) + Let’s Encrypt | digicert.comletsencrypt.org |
| 4 | STRATO | Sectigo + Let’s Encrypt | sectigo.comletsencrypt.org |
| 5 | Cloudflare (Universal SSL) | Google Trust Services + DigiCert + Let’s Encrypt | pki.googdigicert.comletsencrypt.org |
| 6 | AWS (ACM / CloudFront) | Amazon Trust Services | amazon.comamazontrust.comawstrust.comamazonaws.com |
| 7 | Mittwald | Let’s Encrypt + Sectigo | letsencrypt.orgsectigo.com |
| 8 | Webgo | Let’s Encrypt + Sectigo | letsencrypt.orgsectigo.com |
| 9 | raidboxes (Managed WordPress) | Let’s Encrypt | letsencrypt.org |
| 10 | Host Europe / DomainFactory | Sectigo + Let’s Encrypt | sectigo.comletsencrypt.org |
Name Type Flag Tag Value
@ CAA 0 issue "digicert.com"
@ CAA 0 issue "letsencrypt.org"
@ CAA 0 iodef "mailto:security@your-domain.com"
The iodef line (last line) is optional but recommended: CAs report abuse attempts to that address. For subdomains (e.g. shop.your-domain.com) create separate records with the subdomain name instead of @ — modern CAs check parent CAA automatically though.
If your host is not on the list: open your current certificate in the browser (padlock → certificate → issuer). The CA name is shown there (e.g. "Sectigo RSA Domain Validation Secure Server CA" → value sectigo.com). Add that as a CAA record, done.
WordPress plugin: CAA records are NOT created in WordPress but in your domain registrar / DNS provider panel (e.g. Hetzner-Robot, IONOS Domains, Cloudflare Dashboard, INWX, etc.). Common label: "CAA record" or under "TXT records" with type selector "CAA". One separate record per CA.
✓ How to verify it works: On https://www.ssllabs.com/ssltest/analyze.html?d=your-domain.com → "DNS CAA" section → all your CAs should be listed. Or via dig: dig CAA your-domain.com.
2 nameservers present — good redundancy.
IPv6 support present (AAAA records).
SPF record present: v=spf1 ip4:86.107.36.76 +mx +a +ip4:86.107.32.59/24 include:spf.crsend.com ~all — protects against email spoofing.
No DMARC record. The domain is vulnerable to email phishing.
DMARC combines SPF and DKIM into an explicit instruction for receiving mail servers: "What to do if emails claim to come from us but SPF/DKIM fail?" Without DMARC each server decides — usually generously. With DMARC=reject you effectively prevent phishing in your name.
WordPress plugin: DNS matter. TXT record at subdomain _dmarc.your-domain.com. Recommended stages: Observe first: v=DMARC1; p=none; rua=mailto:dmarc-reports@your-domain.com — review reports for weeks. Then tighten: v=DMARC1; p=quarantine; rua=… — suspicious mails go to spam. Final: v=DMARC1; p=reject; rua=… — they’re refused outright.
✓ How to verify it works: dig TXT _dmarc.your-domain.com — or online https://dmarcian.com/dmarc-inspector/.
No security.txt file found (RFC 9116). Security researchers don't know how to report vulnerabilities.
A security.txt (RFC 9116) tells security researchers how to responsibly report vulnerabilities to you. Without it, reports may go to spam or never be sent. A plain text file at the correct path is enough.
File: /.well-known/security.txt (create the folder if it doesn’t exist)
Contact: mailto:security@your-domain.com
Expires: 2027-12-31T23:59:59.000Z
Preferred-Languages: en, de
Canonical: https://your-domain.com/.well-known/security.txt⚠ Replace "security@your-domain.com" with your actual security contact (or a generic info@). "Expires" must be a future date and should be renewed regularly. The file is plain .txt, not PHP.
File: security.txt file in /.well-known/ under your WordPress root
Contact: mailto:security@your-domain.com
Expires: 2027-12-31T23:59:59.000Z
Preferred-Languages: en, de
Canonical: https://your-domain.com/.well-known/security.txt⚠ Via FTP/SFTP create a folder ".well-known" in the WordPress root (the leading dot matters — some FTP tools need "show hidden files" enabled), inside save the file security.txt with the content above. If WordPress redirects the URL: add to .htaccess: RewriteRule ^\.well-known/ - [L]
WordPress plugin: Plugin "security.txt" (search the plugin directory) lets you configure this in the WordPress backend without FTP.
✓ How to verify it works: Open https://your-domain.com/.well-known/security.txt in a browser — content must be visible (no 404).
No external reporting endpoints detected.
Cookie consent system detected: cookieyes.com.
Consent system detected, but banner does not appear to be visible.
Your consent system is wired up but the banner doesn’t appear visibly — perhaps hidden by another plugin or custom CSS. Risk: without a visible banner, no consent is given.
WordPress plugin: Approach: 1) clear browser cache + cookies, use incognito. 2) In the consent plugin: check display conditions (e.g. "only EU visitors" — and you’re testing from a non-EU server). 3) F12 → Console for red errors from consent scripts. 4) Inspector → search DOM for "cookie", "consent" — element present but display:none? z-index too low? 5) Uninstall conflicting cookie-notice plugins.
✓ How to verify it works: Incognito tab, load page, wait 5 seconds — banner visible centered/bottom, doesn’t fully block main content, is clickable.
Trackers are loaded on page load — possibly BEFORE consent is given.
Your trackers are loaded BEFORE the user can consent ("pre-consent loading"). Common misconfiguration in cookie plugins — banner appears, but too late: the GA script is already running. Violates ePrivacy.
WordPress plugin: Almost always caused by the theme or a tracking plugin that embeds the tracker code directly (e.g. "Google Analytics for WordPress" with auto-insert). Fix: 1) remove tracking code from the theme/plugin. 2) In the consent plugin (Complianz/Real Cookie Banner): register the tracker as a "service", paste the snippet there — the plugin will load it only after consent. 3) ALTERNATIVELY: plugin "PYS PixelYourSite" combined with consent gating. Do NOT rely on "GA anonymized before consent" — legally unsettled and risky.
✓ How to verify it works: Incognito → F12 → Network (clear all, start recording) → load page, do NOT click banner, wait 10 seconds → there must be NO requests to google-analytics.com, googletagmanager.com, facebook.com/tr, doubleclick.net etc.
Privacy policy linked: "Privacy Policy" (https://sterkyachts.com/datenschutzerklaerung/).
Legal notice linked: "Imprint" (https://sterkyachts.com/imprint/).
Privacy policy page is accessible (HTTP 200).
All missing security headers combined into one block. Append this block to the end of your .htaccess — done. 5 headers will be set.
The Content-Security-Policy above deliberately includes 'unsafe-inline' for both style-src and script-src. This does NOT provide full XSS protection — it's a pragmatic trade-off, not a bug.
Why? A typical WordPress setup (theme + 5-15 plugins) emits 10-50 different inline <script> blocks into the HTML: jQuery init, slider init, cookie banner, tracking, GTM, web vitals, lazy-load, speculation rules and so on. A strict script-src 'self' blocks them all — the site becomes visually and functionally broken (blank slider, broken cookie banner, dead plugins).
Consequence for scoring: Sites running WordPress with plugins can score at most ~75-85 points in the CSP category in this app — the full 100% rating is only achievable when inline code is signed via nonce or hash (technically demanding, breaks on every theme/plugin update).
Paths to full XSS protection (in increasing complexity):
Anyone who doesn't take one of these paths lives with 'unsafe-inline' — like about 95% of all production WordPress sites on the web. The other CSP directives still protect: default-src 'self' blocks external resources, object-src 'none' bans Flash/Java, frame-ancestors 'self' prevents clickjacking, base-uri 'self' prevents base-tag hijacking. Not maximum protection, but realistic protection for WP reality.
On Hetzner-Konsoleh webhosting (and comparable shared hosts like All-Inkl, IONOS, Strato, 1blu, …), Apache throws a 500 Internal Server Error as soon as Header always edit Set-Cookie … expr=… appears in .htaccess. The Apache error log says:
Can't parse envclause/expression: syntax error, unexpected T_OP_STR_EQ, expecting $end
This is not a WebForensik bug and not a typo — the shared host has blocked the mod_headers expr= subset via AllowOverride limits (for security, because Header edit could also manipulate cookies of other tenants).
☛ For Hetzner-Konsoleh users: use the variant below marked with the red "Hetzner / Shared" badge. It consists of two files (.htaccess + wp-config.php) instead of one, but avoids the 500 error reliably. Cookie flags go into wp-config.php instead of .htaccess.
Append this block to the end of your .htaccess in the web root — done.
<IfModule mod_headers.c>
Header always set Content-Security-Policy "default-src 'self'; img-src 'self' data: https:; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; font-src 'self' https: data:; object-src 'none'; frame-ancestors 'self'; base-uri 'self'; upgrade-insecure-requests"
Header always set X-Content-Type-Options "nosniff"
Header always set Permissions-Policy "camera=(), microphone=(), geolocation=(), payment=(), usb=(), accelerometer=(), gyroscope=(), magnetometer=(), interest-cohort=(), browsing-topics=()"
# Fehlende Cookie-Flags konditional ergänzen (nur wenn nicht schon gesetzt)
Header always edit Set-Cookie "^(.*)$" "$1; HttpOnly" "expr=!(resp('Set-Cookie') -strmatch '*HttpOnly*')"
Header always edit Set-Cookie "^(.*)$" "$1; SameSite=Lax" "expr=!(resp('Set-Cookie') -strmatch '*SameSite*')"
</IfModule>
This variant avoids the 500 Internal Server Error on Hetzner-Konsoleh and similar shared hosts (All-Inkl, IONOS, Strato, 1blu …): the .htaccess only contains the header directives (no "Header edit"), cookie flags move into wp-config.php. Two files to edit instead of one, but guaranteed to run.
# BEGIN WebForensik Security
<IfModule mod_headers.c>
Header always set Content-Security-Policy "default-src 'self'; img-src 'self' data: https:; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; font-src 'self' https: data:; object-src 'none'; frame-ancestors 'self'; base-uri 'self'; upgrade-insecure-requests"
Header always set X-Content-Type-Options "nosniff"
Header always set Permissions-Policy "camera=(), microphone=(), geolocation=(), payment=(), usb=(), accelerometer=(), gyroscope=(), magnetometer=(), interest-cohort=(), browsing-topics=()"
</IfModule>
# END WebForensik Security
Insert ABOVE the line "/* That's all, stop editing! */". Back up wp-config.php first!
// === WebForensik: Cookie-Hardening (Hetzner-Konsoleh-tauglich) ===
// Bitte OBERHALB der Zeile "/* That's all, stop editing! */" einfügen.
// Wirkt auf PHP-Session- und WordPress-Login-Cookies.
// Plugin-eigene Cookies (z.B. WooCommerce, Cookie-Banner) müssen in den
// Plugin-Einstellungen separat auf "Secure" gestellt werden.
@ini_set('session.cookie_httponly', '1');
@ini_set('session.cookie_samesite', 'Lax');
Insert this block ABOVE the "# BEGIN WordPress" line, otherwise WP overwrites it on permalink changes.
# BEGIN WebForensik Security
<IfModule mod_headers.c>
Header always set Content-Security-Policy "default-src 'self'; img-src 'self' data: https:; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; font-src 'self' https: data:; object-src 'none'; frame-ancestors 'self'; base-uri 'self'; upgrade-insecure-requests"
Header always set X-Content-Type-Options "nosniff"
Header always set Permissions-Policy "camera=(), microphone=(), geolocation=(), payment=(), usb=(), accelerometer=(), gyroscope=(), magnetometer=(), interest-cohort=(), browsing-topics=()"
# Fehlende Cookie-Flags konditional ergänzen
Header always edit Set-Cookie "^(.*)$" "$1; HttpOnly" "expr=!(resp('Set-Cookie') -strmatch '*HttpOnly*')"
Header always edit Set-Cookie "^(.*)$" "$1; SameSite=Lax" "expr=!(resp('Set-Cookie') -strmatch '*SameSite*')"
</IfModule>
# END WebForensik Security
If your host disallows .htaccess changes: append this PHP snippet to the end of your CHILD theme's functions.php. Back up first — NEVER edit the parent theme, it gets overwritten on updates.
add_action('send_headers', function () {
header("Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'self'; img-src 'self' data: https:; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; font-src 'self' https: data:; object-src 'none'; frame-ancestors 'self'; base-uri 'self'; upgrade-insecure-requests");
header("X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff");
header("Permissions-Policy: camera=(), microphone=(), geolocation=(), payment=(), usb=(), accelerometer=(), gyroscope=(), magnetometer=(), interest-cohort=(), browsing-topics=()");
});
// Cookie-Flags für PHP-Session-Cookies — wirkt nur auf $_SESSION,
// NICHT auf von Plugins/Themes per setcookie() gesetzte Cookies.
// Für umfassende Cookie-Absicherung die .htaccess-Variante oben verwenden.
add_action('init', function () {
if (headers_sent()) return;
@ini_set('session.cookie_httponly', '1');
@ini_set('session.cookie_samesite', 'Lax');
}, 1);
| Header | Value |
|---|---|
| cache-control | max-age=0 |
| content-encoding | br |
| content-type | text/html; charset=UTF-8 |
| date | Thu, 05 Nov 2026 02:53:37 GMT |
| expires | Thu, 05 Nov 2026 02:53:37 GMT |
| link | <https://sterkyachts.com/wp-json/>; rel="https://api.w.org/", <https://sterkyachts.com/wp-json/wp/v2/pages/459>; rel="alternate"; title="JSON"; type="application/json", <https://sterkyachts.com/>; rel=shortlink |
| referrer-policy | strict-origin-when-cross-origin |
| server | Apache |
| set-cookie | uncode_privacy[consent_types]=%5B%5D; expires=Fri, 05 Nov 2027 02:53:38 GMT; Max-Age=31536000; path=/; secure; SameSite=Strict |
| strict-transport-security | max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains |
| vary | Accept-Encoding |
| x-content-type-options | nosniff nosniff |
| x-frame-options | sameorigin |
| x-ua-compatible | IE=edge |
| x-xss-protection | 1; mode=block |